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Abstract: The impact produced by events occurring in the international 
arena in 1939 were felt by Romania starting with the summer of 1940 when 
the country was forced to give up without a fight the Romanian provinces 
acquired in 1918. Consequences were not only social and economic, but 
also political, causing King Carol II abdication in favour of his son, Mihai 
and the investment with full powers to run the Romanian state of General 
Ion Antonescu. Understanding the impact produced by the summer raptures 
in 1940 among the Romanian population, Antonescu decided to establish as 
main objective for both the foreign policy and the domestic one the 
recovery of these territories. Given his decision to participate in the 
summer of 1941 in the war against USSR, the present study aims to present 
different measures taken by his regime during September 1940 – June 1941 
to regain the lost provinces.  
 
Keywords: Antonescu’s regime, Romanian provinces, territorial losses, 
administrative measures, Bukovina. 
Preliminary considerations 
The outbreak of the German aggression against Poland on the first 
day of September1 marked the beginning of a new world war based, this 
time, on the dissatisfaction of both winners and vanquished after the 
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conclusion of the peace treaties. The evolution of military operations on the 
European stage during 1939 – 1940, the lightning victories obtained by 
Germany in the North – western Europe, especially France’s capitulation2 
made their mark on Romania starting with 26 June 1940 when the Soviet 
Union, through ultimatum notes, asked the cession of Bessarabia and 
northern Bucovina3. The collapse of its security system, the total political 
isolation and the military situation from that time of the Romanian army 
determined the government from Bucharest to accept the conditions impose 
by the soviets4. The acceptance provided by Romania and the way in which 
the U.S.S.R. acted created a precedent in reaffirming the territorial claims 
of Hungary and Bulgaria, thereby the series of territorial cedes continued 
with the Vienna Award (30 August 1940) and the Treaty of Craiova (7 
September 1940) through which our country gave up the Romanian 
provinces acquired at the end of the First World War5. 
The impact produced by the ceded provinces for which generations 
of Romanians fought, led to the deepening crisis of the political regime, 
established by King Carol II in 19386. Alongside the pressure made by 
Germany over Romania led, eventually, to the abdication of King Carol II7 
                                                          
2 Constantin Kirițescu, Romania during the Second World War, Vol. I, București, Universe 
Enciclopedic, 1996, pp. 114 – 116. 
3 ***, Diplomația cotropitorilor. Repercusiunile ei asupra Basarabiei și Bucovinei de 
Nord, Chișinău, Universitas, 1992, p. 134. 
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91 – 102. 
5 Florin Constantiniu, Crossing the Dniester (1941). A controversial decision, București, 
Albatros, 1995, p. 30. 
6 Dan Vătăman, Romania and international studies (1939 – 1947), Vol. I, București, Pro 
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7 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 124. 
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in favour of his son, Mihai8 and the investment of General Ion Antonescu as 
president of the Council of Ministers on 6 September 1940, with full 
powers to run the Romanian state9. 
The crowning of Mihai I as king10 and the appointment as president 
of the Council of Ministers of Ion Antonescu11 represented the first step in 
establishing a new regime in Bucharest, approved by Germany. However, 
civil manifestations caused in the country by the Vienna Award12 
determined the general to address the country, immediately after his 
appointment, asking that all protest be stopped, establishing peace and order 
among the population13. The first measures taken by Antonescu to create a 
working base for his new regime were: abrogating the Constitution and 
dissolving the Parliament14; the dissolution of the Crown Council (6 
September 194015) and the Nations Party (9 September 1940), created by 
Carol II as a substitute for Frontul Salvării Naționale16.  
                                                          
8 Ioan Scurtu (ed.), A collections of documents and materials regarding Romania’s history 
(February 1938 – September 1940), București, Universității, 1974, pp. 282 – 283. 
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foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, 
București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940. 
11 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 
62. 
12 Romanian Central National Archives (hereafter A.N.I.C.), fund Direcția Generală a 
Poliției, file 41/1940, f. 6. 
13 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 
70. 
14 Universul, year 57, No. 245, 6 September 1940, p. 1. 
15 Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 
October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria 
Centrală, 1940, p. 25. 
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On 11 September, Ion Antonescu launched a new appeal for order 
and work to the Romanian people17. At a closer look, clues concerning the 
nature of this new regime can be found, the general’s purpose being not 
only the downfall of a system, `but the creation of another. A new clean life 
regime, a harmonious and brotherly regime between the leaders and the 
subjects`18. In spite of the actions made during the first days in office, 
Antonescu’s concern was to get together a new government that would 
receive the consent of the German Legation in Bucharest. His desire for 
forming a national union government that would represent all the political 
parties was abandoned with the start of negotiations for the new cabinet. 
Two major difficulties were experienced during these discussions, one of 
them was the Iron Guard members, who wanted to obtain a larger number 
of ministries19, and the German Legation, who opposed the idea of co-
opting some members of P.N.Ț. and P.N.L., known for their Anglo – 
French sympathies20. 
In these circumstances, Antonescu’s decision regarding the co-
opting of a political party to the government leadership became public, on 
12 September 1940, through a call for the Legionnaires showing that `The 
country askes to begin together with me, without hesitation and without 
spare, in unity and love, work for straightening and rebuilding in which we 
                                                          
17 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 
76 -77. 
18 Ibidem, p. 76. 
19 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 129. 
20 Ion Gheorghe, A unhappy dictator. Marshal Antonescu (Romania’s road towards a 
satellite State), edition and introductive study by Stelian Neagoe, București, 
Machiavelli, 1996, pp. 132 – 135. 
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started`21. In conclusion, a new government was formed on 14 September 
with key positions occupied by members of the Iron Guard22. Even so, the 
general managed to keep `in his hands` the Minister of Defence, and 
decided to name in the most important people from his trusted circle, such 
as: Mihai Antonescu – the Minister of Justice and Dragomir - Economy23. 
Forming a government with the Iron Guar had as consequence the signing, 
on 16 September 1940, by King Mihai I of decree no. 3151 which stipulated 
that: the Romanian state became national – legionnaire; the Iron Guard, the 
only movement recognised by the new state, was charged with lifting 
morally and material the Romanian people and Ion Antonescu became the 
leader of the state and the chief of the new regime24.  
Understanding the impact produced on the public life in Romania by 
the monarchy, and the potential opposition that would appear in the case of 
abolishment, general Antonescu decided that it would be in his interest to 
use it. In this context, King Mihai I was advanced to general of Division at 
14 September 14025, and in `Call to the nation`, from 15 September, the 
general showed that: `The Royal Family from here on, will be an example 
                                                          
21 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, p. 
80. 
22 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu: the German – 
Romanian relationships (1938 – 1944), București, Humanitas, 2007, p. 98. 
23 Ion Gheorghe, op. cit., p. 144, also see ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 
1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992. 
24 Universul, No. 255, 16 September 1940, p. 1. 
25 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 
83 – 86. 
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of morality, sobriety, righteousness, modesty, civic conscience and patriotic 
behaviour`26, thus becoming a symbol for the Romanian family27.  
Like any other new regime that acceded to power, Antonescu tried 
during the first days not only to consolidate his position, but also to gain 
popularity among the Romanians. Measures like: controlling the fortunes of 
former officials28; monitoring funds used for equipping the army; 
decreasing the number of ministers29; abolishing the function of Regal 
advisor30 made possible promoting the image that Ion Antonescu was an 
incorruptible person and the defender of law.  
 
Ion Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 1941 and the 
national legionnaire state (September – December 1940) 
The instalment of the new regime at Bucharest produced changes 
not only in the domestic politics, but also in the foreign one. Such was the 
case of Romanian’s decision in getting closer to Germany, initially adopted 
by Carol II regime, continued by Antonescu31 with the exception that none 
of the treaties and agreements signed before his appointment were not 
                                                          
26 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of 
history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 37. 
27 Ibidem. 
28 Universul, year 57, No. 251, 11 September 1940, p. 1, also see: Ion Antonescu, The 
foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 October 1940, 
București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului Imprimeria Centrală, 1940. 
29 Universul, year 57, No. 246, 9 September 1940, p. 11. 
30 Universul, year 57, No. 247, 8 September 1940, p. 3. 
31 Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, Plot against Romania. 1939 – 1947. Bessarabia, 
Northern Bukovina and Hertza in the whirlpool of the Second World, București, 
Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1994, pp. 36 – 38. 
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considered available32. Therefore, putting an end to the lack of sincerity in 
foreign politics33, according to Alexandru Constant34. Considered a free 
country that had its external politics founded on consolidating and 
developing its connections with the Axis Powers, fact suggested by 
Antonescu’s statement during the Council of Ministers on 21 September 
1940, `Facing the Axis, I told you: we are going 100% together, till death, 
with the Axis. Either we triumph with the Axis; either we fall with the 
Axis`35.  
Taking into consideration this decision together with guaranties 
offered by Hitler and Mussolini after signing the Vienna Award, we can 
affirm that this was the first measure taken by the new government from 
Bucharest to recover its lost provinces from the summer of 1940. This 
together with the impact produced by the rapture of the Romanian 
territories on the national military system, more precisely on its capacity to 
defend its self in case of an attack36, determined Antonescu to transmit on 
17 September, after a brief consultation with general Kurt von 
Tippelskirch37, to the German authorities from Berlin a request regarding 
the possibility of sending a German military mission in Romania38. This 
                                                          
32 Curentul, year XIII, No. 4542, 3 October 1940, p. 10. 
33 Curentul, year XIII, No. 4538, 29 September 1940, p. 8. 
34 Alexandru Constant – sub secretary of state at The National Ministry of Propaganda 
(Curentul, year XIII, no. 4538, 29 September 1940, p. 8). 
35 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, vol. I, Iasi, 1990, p. 121. 
36 Al. Duțu, M. Retegan (ed.), The liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (22 
June – 26 July 1941), București, Fundației Culturale Române, 1999, p. 52. 
37 Gen. Kurt von Tippelskirch –the 4th Headquarters chef of the General State of the 
German dry Army arrived on 15 September 1940 in București (Aurică Simion, The 
political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, Cluj-Napoca, 
Dacia, 1976, p. 122). 
38 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 143. 
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appeal also contained an extensive project regarding reorganising the 
national army and getting funds to equip its soldieries, materialised after 
extensive discussions carried out with the German officials from Bucharest 
which pointed out that raising the level of instruction of the Romanian 
soldiers and a general reform weren’t enough39.  
A positive response concerning the Romanian request came on 20 
September 194040. The order stated that the real mission of these troops, 
which didn’t have to be obvious neither for the Romanian troops, neither 
for the German ones, was: defending oil fields in case of an attack or its 
destruction; making the necessary plans, according to Germany’s interests, 
for the Romanian army and, not the less, preparing German and Romanian 
troops in case of a war with Soviet Russia41. Realising the diplomatic 
implications of sending a military mission in Romania on German’s foreign 
policy, especially with the Balkan countries, on 10 October 1940, the 
German commanders were informed that they should avoid giving the 
appearance of military occupation of Romania, and give more the 
impression that it was `a transfer of German units in the country`42. After 
this moment, the first German military units occupied their posts on 
Romanian soil on 10 October 194043. A protocol was signed on 22 October 
                                                          
39 Ion Antonescu, The foundation of the national – legionnaire state. 6 September 1940 – 6 
October 1940, București, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria 
Centrală, 1940, pp. 35 – 83. 
40 Gh. Bădescu, Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Bușe (ed.), International relationships 
in acts and documents (1939 – 1945), Vol. II, București, Didactică și Pedagogică, 1976, 
pp. 65 – 66. 
41 Ibidem, p. 66. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 Aurică Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 
1941, Cluj–Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 127. 
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regarding the rules for the German troops that were supposed to station and 
function on the Romanian territory, originally not foreseen in the first 
orders given by Hitler44.  
Aligning Romania’s policy towards the Axis Powers, the entry of 
German troops on Romanian ground, together with the signed protocol 
between the two countries was confirmed officially by the signing, on 23 
November 1940, of the protocol of admitting Romania in the Tripartite 
Pact, also known as the Berlin Pact45. On 4 December, a Romanian – 
German collaboration for reconstructing the Romanian economy was 
signed46. Considering these actions taken by Antonescu immediately after 
being appointed, we can affirm that entering the Tripartite Pact represented 
a prime effort in getting back the lost provinces. Fact sustained by 
Antonescu himself in a letter addressed to Iuliu Maniu on 22 June 1941 in 
which he showed: `Our accession to the Tripartite Pact wasn’t made for 
warranting our actual boarders, because these were truly guaranteed through 
the note exchange intervened with the Vienna arbitration. It was made […] 
precisely to offer us the possibility of putting in discussion in due time our 
rightful claims; the present regime doesn’t recognise the current crippled 
borders and understands to present, as it did until now, the legitimacy of the 
Romanian claims, which contain reuniting its torn boarders`47. This action 
marks the debut of military, political and diplomatic arrangements made for 
                                                          
44 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., pp. 147 -154. 
45 Gheorghe Tătărăscu, Confessions for history, București, Enciclopedică, 1996, p. 418. 
46 Ion Antonescu, The infernos epistolary, notes by Mihai Pelin, București, Viitorul 
Românesc, 1993, pp. 63 – 64. 
47 Ion Calafeteanu (ed.), Iuliu Maniu, Ion Antonescu. Opinions and political 
confrontations.1940 – 1941, Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1994, pp. 66 – 67. 
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recovering through war, the only plausible way against the Soviets, the lost 
territories. 
Simultaneously with these events, general Antonescu tried to obtain 
from the new border lines and the lost territories information necessary in 
evaluating correctly the consequences made by the evacuation in 1940. 
Standing as evidence in this case are numerous memoires forwarded to the 
Prime Minister’s Office by different persons regarding the refugee’s 
situation48 together with various acts and statistics send by institutions, 
containing information’s regarding employees engaged in evacuating these 
territories49.  
After analysing petitions sent to the Prime Minister’s Office, we can 
affirm that the first months of Ion Antonescu’s governing lacked of real 
measure for improving the living conditions of refugees from Bessarabia 
and northern Bucovina fact sustained by `Memoire about the agricultural 
owner’s refugees from Bessarabia, northern Bucovina and Dorohoi`50. This 
document is opened by criticisms made by agricultural owners to the 
government which in the sixth months after losing the north-eastern 
provinces suffered `all the shortcomings and all the sufferance`, without 
seeing any measures taken by the authorities to integrate economically, 
politically and socially the evacuated persons51. The list of compunctions 
reveals that discrimination was made by the regime concerning the way the 
evacuation and relocation of people from the ceded territories in June – 
                                                          
48 A.N.I.C., fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, file138 / 1941, ff. 166 -175. 
49 Idem, fund Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, file 10/1940, ff. 30 – 40. 
50 Idem, fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, file 138 / 1941, ff. 166 -175. 
51 Ibidem, f. 166. 
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September 1940. Despite the people’s disappointment towards the attitude 
showed the administration, the memoir presents some suggestions and 
recommendations relevant in helping individuals to integrate in the society 
becoming a productive element52. A rather interesting aspect found in this 
document is the awareness of these simple people, marched at their turn by 
a terrible drama, of the impact products by these territorial losses on the 
internal life of Romania53. 
Nevertheless, why didn’t Antonescu’s regime managed to take 
actions in helping the refugees from the Bessarabia and Bucovina 
territories? The answer can be found in the relationship between the general 
and the Iron Guard which from the first days in office started not only a 
collaboration, but also a fight in seizing the power. Thus, the instalment of 
the new regime meant on the one hand the care of Antonescu to re-establish 
order and discipline in the country and on the other hand how the 
Legionnaires considered their position as a way of getting revenge for all 
the sufferings caused by different political personalities against them54. This 
`competition` became evident to the public eye starting with 11 September 
when during a `Call for order` the general mentions  the commotion 
produced by some anarchic movements, as well as the warning that 
`General Antonescu does not threaten anyone, and does not hesitate`55.  
Despite Antonescu’s requests, the Legionnaires misconduct 
continued, culminating in the night of 26 to 27 November 1940 with the 
                                                          
52 Ibidem, ff. 170 – 173. 
53 Ibidem, f. 174. 
54 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., pp. 158 – 159. 
55 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of 
history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 33. 
Elena Cazacu  RJHIS 4 (1) 2017 
 
 
 
114 
 
shooting, in Jilava Penitentiary and in the police post from the capital, of 
over 70 former officials and functionaries56. The series of political 
assassinations continued with that of Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu57. 
In spite of Antonescu’s declarations during the meetings of the Prime 
Minister’s Office on 2758 and 28 November59, his threats remained only at a 
theoretical state, the fight between the two being postponed until the perfect 
moment both internally and externally60. Because of this decision, the 
general tried to obtain during the next month support from Hitler – 
externally, and from people – internally to impose a new order and 
discipline in the nation61. 
 
The beginning of the military dictatorship (January – June 1941) 
The conflict between the general and Legionnaires reached new 
heights starting with January 1941 when the main goal of everyone was 
obtaining Hitler’s support and eliminating their competition. In this context, 
the efforts made by Horia Sima and Ion Antonescu concluded with an 
opened invitation from the German Fuhrer on 12 January, but only one – 
the general decided to accept it62. The effect of this meeting, on 14 
                                                          
56 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 162. 
57 ***, On the brink of disaster. 21 – 23 January 1941, Vol. I, București, Scripta, 1992, pp. 
186 -188. 
58 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, Vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 163 -165. 
59 Ibidem, pp. 166 -168. 
60 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 163. 
61 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, 
Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 236. 
62 Dan Vătăman, op.cit., p. 166. 
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January63, was felt upon the internal situation right after his return, on 15 
January64, when in an open letter to Sima, Antonescu denounces and 
criticises the abuses, robberies and crimes committed by the Iron Guard65. 
The way he decides to conclude the letter, `Do you want to go ahead, go 
alone, but not with general Antonescu […] He entered the political arena to 
save the nation, not to lead it to an even greater disaster`66 shows us the 
final decision made by Antonescu after obtaining Hitler’s permission.  
Without reactions from the Iron Guard and its leader, Horia Sima, 
towards Antonescu’s letters and declarations, in conjunction with actions 
taken against them culminated on 21 January with a legionnaire rebellion in 
the entire state67. Antonescu decided to offer 24 hours as a term for re-
establishing the order in the nation, affirming that `I was not yesterday and 
do not want to be until tomorrow an instrument of tyranny, nor a bridge for 
anarchy`68. The acts of violence committed during these days made victims 
even among the civil population, according to figures published in the 
newspapers more than 236 citizens from the capital lost their life’s, and 
another 254 were injured69. As a result, after gaining military support, on 22 
                                                          
63 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, Vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 174 – 176. 
64 Ibidem, pp. 177 – 180. 
65 Ibidem, pp. 181 – 184. 
66 Ibidem, p. 184. 
67 Mihai Fătu, Ion Spălățelu, The Iron Guar – a fascist terrorist organisation, București, 
Politică, 1971, p. 349. 
68 Ion Antonescu, To the Romanians… Calls-speeches-documents. At the crossroad of 
history, București, SOCEC & Co, S.A.R., 1941, p. 125. 
69 Universul, year 58, no. 43, 12 February 1941, p. 1. 
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January, from the German troops dislocated in the capital70 on the night of 
22 to 23 January began the military intervention against the legionnaires71.  
In front of these new circumstances, Horia Sima was constrained to 
order, in the morning of 23 January 1941, the members of his organisation 
to cease fire and evacuate the public institutions taken under siege. 
Published in the pages of the newspaper `Curentul`, the order presents the 
verdict to stop fights as a consequence of treaty talks started among the 
state and the Iron Guard72. 813 dead and wounded among the army, rebels 
and civilians was the total of victims fallen in the country during the 
legionnaire rebellion that took place on 21 – 23 January73. The organised 
rebellion of the legionnaire concluded with their removal from governance 
and the banning of their organisation. A vast majority of persons that held, 
during their administration, key functions choose to get shelter at different 
German functionaries which permitted them later to `pass` in Germany 
where they could ask for political asylum74. 
As a consequence of this rebellion, on 27 January 1941 a new 
military govern was formed by general Antonescu. His decision to co-opt 
military individuals was argued by the lack of civic courage among men 
that preferred to limit themselves at protests and critics towards the 
                                                          
70 Gh. Buzatu, Marshal Antonescu facing history, vol. I, Iași, 1990, pp. 191 -192. 
71 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, 
Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, p. 267. 
72 Curentul, year XIV, no. 99, 23 January 1941, p. 1. 
73 Ion Calafeteanu, “The Legionnaire rebellion seen by Antonescu’s cabinet”, Historia, 
http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/actualitate/articol/rebeliunea-legionar-v-zut-
cabinetul-lui-antonescu, (accessed on 13 July 2016). 
74 A. Simion, The political regime in Romania during September 1940 – January 1941, 
Cluj-Napoca, Dacia, 1976, pp. 271 – 272. 
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authorities than taking part in the decisive institutions of the nation75. The 
series of measures taken during this period by Antonescu to re-establish the 
law and order in the state conclude, on 14 February, with the promulgation 
of decree no. 314 through which `the national – legionnaire state` was 
abolished, withal any political actions, indifferent of its nature, until new 
regulations appeared were forbidden76. 
Despite the modifications made immediately after the rebellion, Ion 
Antonescu decided to hold, in March, a plebiscite to get the opinion of the 
nation regarding the way in which his regime managed the state affaires 
after 6 September 1940. This referendum was not only an enquiry, but it 
also tried to see if the promoted policy and the general’s action were 
confused by the Romanian people with the legionary movement77. 
Therefore, when the question `Do you give General Antonescu your 
complete confidence to rule the State further to lift the Nation and defend 
your rights? `, addressed on 2 March78, 2.960.298 people gave their vote to 
the general’s regime out of 2.963.294 voters79. We can affirm that the vote 
casted by the Romanian people came both as a public confirmation of 
Antonescu’s policy and a debut of a new regime, this time only a personal 
dictatorship. 
                                                          
75 Nicolae Ciachir, The Great Powers and Romania (1856 – 1947), București, Albatros, 
1996, p. 168. 
76 Monitorul Oficial, No. 39, 15 February 1941, p. 758. 
77 M. Ciucă, A. Teodorescu, B. Popovici (ed.), Transcripts of the Council of Ministries’ 
meetings. Ion Antonescu’s governing, vol. I (September– December 1940), București, 
1997 – 1998, p. 438. 
78 Curentul, year XIV, No. 4689, 5 March 1941, p. 1. 
79 Monitorul Oficial, No. 60, 12 March 1941, p. 1238. 
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The return of law and order in the country after the legionary 
rebellion permitted the new government to focus its attention in taking the 
measurements necessary to regain the lost provinces during the summer 
rapt in 1940. An important aspect to mention is that regardless of the 
evolution of events on the internal political arena, the authorities were 
constantly in the loop with the situation from Bessarabia and northern 
Bucovina, fact confirmed by the notes and informative bulletins forwarded 
by different institutions (Direcția Generală de Politie, Inspectoratul General 
al Jandarmeriei)80 to the Prime Minister’s Office. 
If internally, the months that passed after obtaining the vote of 
confidence from the Romanians can be characterised by order and peace, 
according to the countless appeals launched by Antonescu, on the 
international arena, especially the Balkan peninsula, things weren’t as good. 
We remind Bulgaria’s adherence on 1 March 1941 to the Berlin Pact which 
led to the German troops passing through the Bulgarian territories to reach 
the Greek frontiers81. Germany’s plans concerning the campaign from south 
– eastern Europe suffered modifications on 27 March when the 
Yugoslavian government was overturned as a consequence of deciding to 
sign the Accession for the Tripartite Pact (25 March 1941)82. The naming of 
a new regime meant not only a new leader, but also changes in the foreign 
politics lend until now, in this case the sympathies general Simovici had for 
the Soviets triumphed on 5 April 1941 with the signing of a nonaggression 
                                                          
80 For more information’s we recommend seen A.N.I.C., funds: Direcției Generale a 
Poliției, Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, Inspectoratul Regional al Jandarmeriei. 
81 Platon Chirnoagă, Political and military history of Romania’s war against Soviet Russia. 
22June 1941 – 23 August 1944, 3rd edition, Iași, FIDES, 1997, p. 77. 
82 Platon Chirnoagă, op. cit., p. 77. 
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and friendship pact with the U.S.S.R.83, culminating the following day, 6 
April, with a launched attack from Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria 
against Yugoslavia. This offence concludes on 17 April with the defeat of 
the Yugoslavian army and the division of its lands between the winners84. 
Ten days later, the same soldiers manage to occupy Athena (27 April), and 
on 29 Peloponnese85. 
Although Germany decided to intervene in the Balkan peninsula, 
Romania did not participate in these military operations against Greece and 
Yugoslavia, even in this context the simple fact of permitting the passing of 
German troops on its soil was seen by the western countries as a proof of 
joining the German politics86, confirmed by the English government on 15 
February 1941 when diplomatic relationships between the two countries are 
broken, and the United States Legation become an intermediary state in 
representing the English interests in our country87. A few months later, on 6 
May 1941 the American Legation from Bucharest become intermediary, 
this time, between Romania and Yugoslavia, because of Antonescu’s 
decision to recognise the independence of Croatia88. 
The striking rapid victories obtained by Hitler in Europe, except 
England, represented the foundation of his decision to apply the plan 
regarding a possible invasion of Russia. The hypothesis of a war between 
                                                          
83 Ibidem. 
84 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 187. 
85 Platon Chirnoagă, op. cit., p. 77. 
86 Dan Vătăman, op. cit., p. 187. 
87 Ibidem. 
88 For details regarding the relationship between Romania and Yugoslavia see Sorin Oane, 
“How the friendship between Romania and Yugoslavia broke”, Historia, 
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the two countries took shape starting with July 1940 when the articles 
stipulated in the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact were exhausted, grounds on 
which Hitler order the elaboration of a war plan against the soviets89. The 
failure of the German – Russian negotiations in November concerning a 
possible adherence to the Berlin Pact determined the Fuhrer to sign on 18 
December 1940, Direction No. 21, mainly know today as the Barbarossa 
Plan90. This direction became permanent on 31 January 1941 when the day 
for beginning the operation (Z day) was established on 27 March 1941, 
however the events from south – eastern Europe led to postponing it to 22 
June 194191.  
The increased attention given by Hitler to the Barbarossa Plan after 
the Balkan campaign was felt by Romania in the month of May when the 
11th German Army headquarters were transferred on Romanian soil92. 
Aware of the significates brought by such a move, Antonescu, through his 
German contacts, asked that the official date (Z day) for beginning 
operations to be communicated with at least 2 weeks in advance to correctly 
mobilise his army93. As a result, to his request official details regarding the 
Barbarossa Plan were brought to the general’s attention on 12 June 1941 
during his official visit in München94. Taking advantage of this meeting, 
Antonescu transmitted, after long debates and negotiations, the decision to 
                                                          
89 Adrian Pandea, “Loyalty towards Hitler or anti-Communist crusade? The Reich’s allies 
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fight alongside Germany and start a war against the Soviet Union95, 
therefore representing the most important action taken by Antonescu’s 
regime to regain the lost territories from the summer of 1940. 
 
Conclusions  
 
King Carol II’s abdication in favour of his son, Mihai and the 
appointment of general Ion Antonescu as president of the Council of 
Ministers with full power on 6 September had as main consequence the fact 
that the legionnaires come to power. Understanding the impact produced by 
the territorial raptures from the summer of 1940 on the Romanian people, 
Antonescu establishes as main objective both the internal and foreign policy 
recovering the Romanian provinces. In this regard, the accession of 
Romania to the Berlin Pact, the administrative reform, the extensive 
program for reorganising and the modernization of the Romanian army, the 
decision to fight alongside Germany against the Russians represented only a 
few measures taken by Antonescu’s regime during September 1940 – June 
1941 for returning Romania’s borders known after World War I. Taking 
these aspects into consideration, together with the evolution of events in the 
international arena, we can affirm that the Antonescu’s regime during the 
first months was centred on regaining the lost Romanian territories for 
which entire generations of Romanians fought. 
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